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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TATES, INC., : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
vs • : 
CASE NO. 14415 
LITTLE AMERICA REFINING CO., : 
A Corporation dba LITTLE 
AMERICA, : 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the second appeal by the plaintiff in this 
case, being an action to recover the amount allegedly owing 
on the sale by plaintiff to defendant of a passenger bus, subject 
to defendant's affirmative defense of a deduction for damages 
incurred because of plaintiff's failure to deliver the bus 
when promised. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried on the me-r • ::$ . •- • - r.d aay 
of March, 1974, before Honorable Gordon R. Hall, District Judge, 
at the conclusion of which judgment was entered in accordance 
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with defendant's Motion to Dismiss and that an accord and 
satisfaction had been made resulting in dismissal of the 
Complaint and of the Counterclaim. 
Thereafter, the said judgment was appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Utah by the plaintiff and reversed by order 
of the Supreme Court on May 15, 1975. 
Thereafter, the plaintiff on the 27th day of June, 
1975, filed its Motion for Judgment and Costs, which was 
resisted by the defendant; and on the 4th day of September, 
1975, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment were 
entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in 
the amount of $3,407.26 plus interest or a total of $5,349.06 
and costs in the amount of $118.20; and the Court ruled that 
the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the Counterclaim and 
that the same had been dismissed with prejudice with no 
appeal therefrom. 
Thereafter, and on September 12, 1975, the defendant 
filed a Motion for New Trial, which was noticed for hearing 
on September 18, 1975, at which time in open court Keith E. 
Sohm, attorney for the plaintiff, and Richard L. Bird, Jr., 
attorney for the defendant, stipulated that the evidence at 
the original trial of the action was still before the Court, 
where and if material, and that upon written memoranda as to 
the facts and the law, the Court would rule upon the Motion for 
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New Trial and upon the set-off affirmatively pleaded in the 
Answer to the Complaint, if the Court ruled that it was 
properly before the Court, 
Thereafter, on December 30, 1975, a judgment was 
entered awarding plaintiff $414.76, which was determined by 
deducting the defendant's damages of $2,992.50 from the amount 
owing to the plaintiff on the contract of $3,407.26. Plaintiff 
was also awarded its costs in the amount of $118.20. (R. 5) 
In support of this judgment, the lower Court found that it 
could properly consider defendant's affirmative defense for 
the deduction of its damages from the price due to the plaintiff 
on the contract; that the plaintiff had promised delivery of the 
bus by the end of November, 19 72, and its failure to deliver 
by that time was a breach of the contract; that defendant's 
damages of $2,992.50 were reasonable and should be deducted 
from the price owing to the plaintiff; and that plaintiff's 
claim for $845 for the repair of its loaner bus was without 
merit. (R. 16) 
Plaintiff has appealed from that judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant respectfully submits that the decision 
and judgment of the lower Court should be affirmed and that 
plaintiff's request for interest, attorneys' fees and $845 
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plus interest for alleged damage to its loaner bus should be 
denied. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant generally agrees with plaintiff's statement 
of the facts; however, there are some inconsistencies which will 
be designated in this statement of the facts as defendant finds 
them. Defendant does not agree with the plaintiff's statement 
that this Court has already ruled in favor of judgment for the 
plaintiff and finds nothing in this Court's opinion to support 
that assertion. (R. 58) Moreover, this is a conclusion of law 
and not a statement of fact. 
The plaintiff sent a letter dated January 12, 1972 to 
the defendant offering to sell the defendant a bus with certain 
specifications. (R. 97) Plaintiff indicated in its letter that 
it could make delivery in approximately ninety days (R. 97). 
On January 21, 19 72, the defendant accepted the plaintiff's offer 
by sending it an order, making reference to the plaintiff's letter 
of January 12 (R. 98.5). Plaintiff knew that the time of delivery 
was critical to the defendant, inasmuch as the rush season for 
the defendant would begin in June. (Tr. 56) When the bus was not 
delivered within the approximate ninety-day period, numerous 
contacts were made between the parties concerning delivery of 
the bus. (Tr. 57) Recognizing the defendant's need and its 
obligation to supply a bus, plaintiff gave a loaner bus to the 
defendant free of charge and without obligation for its temporary 
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use. (Tr. 59-60) 
In September and October, 19 72, the plaintiff sought 
to obtain a partial payment from the defendant but without 
success, because it could not give the defendant adequate 
assurance of a date of delivery. (Tr. 99) When the plaintiff 
was billed by its supplier for the construction of the chassis, 
it once again contacted the defendant for a partial payment. 
In a meeting on November 3, 1972, the plaintiff promised 
delivery of the bus by the end of November, 1972 (Tr. 62) and 
in reliance thereon, the defendant paid $10,000 by check dated 
November 3, 19 72, and not November 11, 1972 as is indicated 
by the plaintiff in its statement of the facts (Ex. 5-D, Tr. 
63). In December, 1972, the defendant returned the plaintiff's 
loaner bus, because it was inoperable. 
Because defendant was without a bus, it rented a bus 
from Rock Springs-Jackson Bus Line at a cost of $2,992.50 from 
December 1, 1972 to and including January 16, 1973 (R. 85), at 
which time the bus for which is had contracted was delivered 
(R. 99). The bus was picked up from the plaintiff by Dave 
Timlin, an employee of Little America, whose scope of employment 
went no further than taking physical delivery of the bus for 
Little America. (Tr. 78) He signed an invoice as having 
received it. (R. 99) 
The defendant denies the assertion of plaintiff that 
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a delivery receipt and billing were sent to Little America soon 
after January 17, 1973 (Tr. 83.5). On February 12, 1973, the 
defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff setting out its damages, 
which had been deducted from the price due for the bus (R. 84), 
and then delivered a check dated February 17, 1973 for the net 
balance of $15,107.11 (Ex. 7-D, Tr. 67). 
The defendant disagrees with the plaintiff's statement 
that this Court considered the matter once and in effect said 
defendant couldn't hold out $3,4 07.26, giving judgment to the 
plaintiff for that amount. Defendant finds nothing in this 
Court's decision on the first appeal to support such a statement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EFFECT OF THIS COURT'S REVERSAL ON THE 
.FIRST APPEAL WAS TO PLACE THE PARTIES IN THE 
SAME POSITION AS THEY WERE BEFORE THE JUDGMENT 
WAS RENDERED IN THE LOWER COURT 
In Phebus, et al. v. Dunford, 114 Utah 292, 198 P.2d 
973 (1948), the Supreme Court had before it for a second time a 
quiet title action involving conflicting claims of the parties. 
In rendering judgment on the first appeal, the court had directed: 
"The decision of the lower court is reversed, and 
the case remanded to that court for proceedings 
to conform to this opinion. Costs to appellant." 
198 P.2d 973. 
On remand, the successful appellants wanted the lower court to 
set aside its former decision and enter judgment for them. The 
court held that no action in the trial court was necessary to 
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set aside its former decision and enter judgment for them. The 
court held that no action in the trial court was necessary to 
set aside the decision, because the action of the Supreme Court 
had accomplished that without anything further. The court then 
held: 
"A reversal of a judgment or decision of a lower 
court such as this places the case in the position 
it was before the lower court rendered that judg-
ment or decision and vacates all proceedings and 
orders dependent upon the decision which was 
reversed." Id. at 974. 
The court went on to state that the lower court did not need to 
take any action to vacate its former decision, because the 
reversal by the Supreme Court had effectually vacated and 
set aside that decision, and then stated: 
"The lower court's former decision, in its 
entirety, having been set aside, that court 
should proceed to a determination of the case 
the same as if no such previous decision by it 
had been rendered. The only restriction 
imposed upon it in accomplishing a final 
determination of the case lies in the issues 
decided upon the appeal to this Supreme Court. 
[See citation] Those issues may not be acted 
upon or decided contrary to the way they were 
decided by this court. Other than that 
restriction, the lower court may act in this 
case as it may act in any case at a time prior 
to its final determination of the facts and law 
of the case." Id. at 974. 
In its ruling on the first appeal in the present case, 
Tates, Inc. v. Little America, 535 P.2d 1228, this Court described 
the situation as follows: 
"At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, 
defendant moved for dismissal. The trial court 
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reserved rui. ing thereon; and after defendant had 
presented j s evidence, the court granted the 
motion to dismiss on the ground that there had 
been an accord and satisfaction. Plaintiff 
appeals attacking that ruling." 
In addition to asserting as error the ruling of an accord and 
satisfaction, the plaintiff also alleged that the lower court 
had erred in denying plaintiff's claim for $845 cost to over-
haul its loaner bus and in allowing defendant's cost in renting 
a bus to be assessed against the plaintiff, and for allowing 
unreasonable costs to be assessed. After stating its decision 
and the reasons therefor, this Court concluded: 
"Accordingly, the finding of an accord and 
satisfaction and the judgment based thereon 
are in error. 
"Other matters assigned as error have been 
considered and are deemed to be without 
merit. 
"The judgment is reversed. Costs to plaintiff 
(appellant)." 535 P.2d 1231. 
The defendant submits that in accordance with Phebus v. Dunford, 
supra, the situation on remand to the lower court was that the 
parties were placed in the same position as they had been prior 
to the ruling by the lower court that there was an accord and 
satisfaction, and that the lower court only needed to make a 
determination of the case as if no such previous decision by it 
had been rendered, with the restriction that it make no ruling 
contrary to the decision of this Court, which was that there 
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was no accord and satisfaction; that the lower court was not 
in error in denying plaintiff's claim for $845 to repair its 
loaner bus; and that the lower court was not in error in allowing 
defendant's damages to be assessed against the plaintiff in an 
amount which was not unreasonable. This the lower court pro-
ceeded to do and properly rejected plaintiff's claim that this 
Court's reversal meant that plaintiff should have judgment on 
its claim and that defendant's claim for damages by way of 
set-off or recoupment was without merit. Upon receiving 
memoranda on the law and facts, the lower court properly pro-
ceeded to make its determination. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAD PROMISED DELIVERY OF THE BUS BY THE END OF 
NOVEMBER, 19 72 AND THAT PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO 
DELIVER BY THAT TIME WAS A BREACH OF THE CONTRACT 
In its decision on the first appeal, this Court stated 
the manner in which it will review the facts found by the trial 
court: 
"On appeal we apply the traditional rules of 
review: We assume that the trial court believed 
those aspects of the evidence which may be deemed 
to support his finding and judgment; and we survey 
the evidence in the light favorable thereto. 
Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 356, 453 P.2d 
155." 535 P.2d 1228. 
In its Memorandum Decision (R. 16), the lower court 
found: 
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"2. That the Court previously found in Findings 
of Fact No, 6 that when plaintiff demanded a down 
payment of $10,000 it promised delivery by the 
end of November, 1972." 
In making that decision, the lower court was citing a prior 
Finding of Fact prepared by the plaintiff, which recites: 
"6. On or about November 3, 1972, plaintiff 
demanded a substantial payment and promised 
delivery of the bus by the end of November, 
19 72, whereupon defendant made the deposit of 
$10,000." (R. 29) 
In the fall of 1972, Mr, Knaus requested a down payment, 
which generated a lot of discussion (Tr. 61). Mr* Knight wanted 
to be assured that he would receive delivery of the bus before 
he made a down payment. The testimony at this point was as 
follows (beginning at Tr. 62, line 7): 
"Q (Mr. Bird) . . . I want you to try to address 
yourself to the conversation between you and Mr. 
Knight just before the time when he released 
$10,000. 
"A My whole feeling about that is what the factory 
had told me and then I promised him. 
"Q You don't remember what you told Mr. Knight? 
"A Yes. This same thing. 
"Q What did you tell? 
"A Well, to the best as to what the factory was 
telling me we could deliver in a certain length 
of time and I'm not sure that I know the date that 
you're referring to because there were several 
times in there. 
"Q Well, the check for $10,000 is dated November 3rd, 
1972. 
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"Q Thqn that would have to be the date we had the 
conversation, yes." (Tr. 62) 
In referring to this same conversation in his testimony, Mr. 
Knight testified: 
"Our conversation was that he had asked on several 
occasions for a down payment or money to be paid 
to him to pay to Madsen Corporation for the work 
that they had completed on the chassis; and I had 
not made such payment on November 3rd. Mr. Knaus 
came to see me and we had a conversation regarding 
the bus. He said that he had spoken to the people 
at Ward and he had talked with someone who was in 
authority at Ward and that he felt good about the 
answer he had received; and for the first time he 
felt confident that we would have the bus by the 
end of November. And said that they did make — 
need to make a payment to Madsen. And based upon 
the promise of a delivery by the end of November, 
which he said was a date he felt good about and 
that he was sure it could be back made, I then 
gave him $10,000 in a check made out jointly to 
Tates, Inc. and Jay Madsen Corporation." (Tr. 
99) 
This promise of the plaintiff to make delivery by the 
end of November, 1972, supplied a term which had been left 
indefinite in the original agreement and was supported by 
payment of $10,000. A contract may be formed, although some 
terms are left open. At U.C.A. § 70A-2-204(3), it states 
"Even though one or more terms are left open, a 
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness 
if the parties have intended to make a contract 
and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving 
an appropriate remedy." 
When the time for delivery is indefinite in a contract, U.C.A. 
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§ 70A-2-309(l) applies: 
"The time for shipment or delivery or any other 
action under a contract if not provided in this 
chapter or agreed upon shall be a reasonable 
time." 
In determining what is a reasonable time, U.C.A. § 70A-l-204(2) 
provides: 
"What is a reasonable time for taking any action 
depends on the nature, purpose, and circumstances 
of such action." 
In the Official Coments to this section of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which are not set forth in our volume of the 
Utah Code but which may be found following the identical sections 
in the Idaho Code, Title 28, states at § 2 8-1-204, Comment 2: 
"Under the section [referring to § 70A-1-204], the 
agreement which fixes the time need not be part 
of the main agreement, but may occur separately." 
Defining the term "agreement", U.C.A. § 70A-1-201(3) 
states: 
"'Agreement1 means the bargain of the parties in 
fact as found in their language or by implication 
from other circumstances, including course of 
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance 
as provided in this Act." 
The language used by the parties in the conversations cited 
above shows that an agreement for the delivery of the bus by 
the end of November was in fact made. In addition, the strong 
implication to be drawn from the fact that the plaintiff had 
not made delivery within the approximate ninety-day period 
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originally specified and the fact that Mr. Knight was not . 
willing to make a down payment until assurances of delivery 
by a specified date were made, is that an agreement.for 
delivery by the end of November, 1972, was in fact made. 
The consideration to support this agreement was the 
payment of $10,000 by Little America at a date prior to the 
time it was previously obligated to make payment under the 
original contract. Since the original contract did not 
specify a date for payment, Little America was not obligated 
to make payment until the bus was delivered. See U.C.A. 
§ 70A-2-310(a). By making a payment of $10,000 before 
delivery, Little America supplied consideration to support 
the plaintiff's promise to deliver by the end of November, 
1972. 
Although consideration was given, it was technically 
unnecessary because: 
"An agreement modifying a contract within this 
Article needs no consideration to be binding." 
U.C.A. § 70A-2-209(l). 
Even if this Court determines that the lower court was 
in error in finding a promise for delivery by the end of November 
after viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
sustaining of that decision, this Court should still find that 
plaintiff's delivery of the bus beyond the end of November was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-14-
beyond a reasonable time and, therefore, a breach of the 
contract. Plaintiff specified in its offer that delivery could 
be made within approximately ninety days (R. 97), and was aware 
that it was very important for the defendant to have the bus 
delivered for the rush season during the summer (Tr. 56). Plaintiff 
recognized that its delay was unreasonable in supplying the 
loaner bus without charge. In making his $10,000 payment to 
the plaintiff on November 3, 1972, Mr. Knight notified the plaintiff 
that the end of November would be the end of the reasonable time 
for delivery of the bus and that after that time, Tate's would 
be considered to be in breach of the contract. Mr. Knight 
testified concerning a conversation with the plaintiff in February 
of 19 73 regarding the defendant's damages incurred because of 
the plaintiff's failure to deliver the bus by the end of November. 
Mr. Knight stated: 
"I explained to them that since the end of November, 
which had been the promise — the last promised 
delivery date that we had had a situation where 
both the loaner bus and the flexible bus were out 
of commission and that they could not be run. And 
that I had had expenses that had accrued as a 
result of that. And I explained that I was taking 
the November 30th date because that had been the date 
that was promised in association with the $10,000 
check; and that I had accumulated my expenses 
since that date and I enumerated those and told 
him that these were expenses that we had incurred." 
(Tr. 100) 
In Idaho Code § 28-2-309, Comment 5 of the Official Comments 
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to the Uniform Commercial Code in reference to the identical 
provision at U.G.A. § 70A-2-309, states: 
"The obligation of good faith under this Act 
requires reasonable notification before a 
contract may be treated as breached because 
a reasonable time for delivery or demand has 
expired. This operates both in the case of the 
contract originally indefinite as to time and 
of one subsequently made indefinite by waiver." 
And Comment 6 states: 
"• . • Effective communication of a proposed 
time limit calls for a response, so that failure 
to reply will make out acquiescence. . . . Only 
when a party insists on undue delay or on rejection 
of the other party's reasonable proposal is there 
a question of flat breach "under the present 
section." 
The plaintiff did not reject the defendant's proposal for delivery 
by the end of November. On the contrary, they made a promise 
and gave strong assurances that delivery would be made by that 
time. When an undue delay beyond the end of November occured, 
the reasonable time for delivery was ended and plaintiff was in 
breach under the contract. 
A party to a contract is in breach of that contract if 
it fails to fulfill the obligations of the contract. U.C.A. 
§ 70A-2-301 states: 
"The obligation of the seller is to transfer and 
deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and 
pay in accordance with the contract." 
By the failure of the plaintiff to deliver the bus by the end of 
November, 1972 as promised or within a reasonable time, which 
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time terminated at the end of November, 19 72, the plaintiff was 
in breach of its obligation to deliver under the contract. 
Acceptance by the defendant of the bus did not constitute 
a waiver of the breach. U.C.A. § 70A-2-607(2) on effect of 
acceptance, states: 
"Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes 
rejection of the goods accepted and if made 
with knowledge of a nonconformity cannot be 
revoked because of it . . . but acceptance 
does not of itself impair any other remedy 
provided by this chapter for nonconformity." 
This section further provides at (3): 
"Where a tender has been accepted, the buyer 
must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach 
notify the seller of breach or be barred from 
any remedy." 
The bus was delivered on January 16, 1973 (R. 99). 
Shortly thereafter on February 12, 1973, and before final payment 
was made, Little America notified the plaintiff that it had breached 
its obligation by delivering the bus after the end of November, 
19 72, and that Little America was going to deduct its expenses 
incurred because of that breach from the price remaining to be 
paid (Tr. 100, 122; R. 84). Although the plaintiff was in breach 
under the contract, because of the defedant's need for the bus, 
it never expressed an intention to terminate the contract because 
of the breach, but decided to accept the bus and then assert 
its damages as a deduction against the price. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DEDUCTED DEFENDANT'S 
DAMAGES OCCASIONED BY PLAINTIFF'S BREACH FROM 
THE PRICE DUE TO PLAINTIFF 
Defendant asserted two affirmative defenses in its Answer 
and also asserted a Counteclaim. Its first affirmative defense 
states: 
"Defendant denies that there is a balance due 
on the contract and affirmatively alleges in 
respect thereto that because of the 270-day 
late delivery, the defendant suffered damages 
exceeding the claim of plaintiff, which amounts 
should be offset against the claim of plaintiff." 
(R. 94) 
The defendant's second affirmative defense was accord and satis-
faction and its Counterclaim was for damages because of plaintiff's 
failure to deliver the bus as promised. The lower Court's 
finding of an accord and satisfaction was appealed to this Court 
and was reversed. The defendant did not appeal on its Counter-
claim. Therefore, when the case was remanded, the lower Court 
could not consider the accord and satisfaction. However, the 
plaintiff's Complaint and the defendant's first affirmative 
defense asserted in its Answer still remained and the lower 
Court was required to make its decision based thereon, even if 
the counterclaim was not to be considered. 
Set-off and recoupment and deduction of damages for 
breach may be pleaded as affirmative defenses. U.C.A. 
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§ 70A-2-714 on buyer's damages for breach in regard to accepted 
goods, at (1) states: 
"Where the buyer has accepted goods and given 
notification [Subsection (3) of Section 70A-2-607], 
he may recover as damages for any nonconformity 
of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary 
course of events from the seller's breach as 
determined in any manner which is reasonable." 
Also, U.C.A. § 70A-2-717 on deduction of damages from price, 
states: 
"The buyer on notifying the seller of his 
intention to do so may deduct all or any 
part of the damages resulting from any breach 
of the contract from any part of the price 
still due under the same contract." 
Utah has adopted the same provision concerning affirma-
tive defenses as is found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In commenting on Rule 8(c), which sets forth typical affirmative 
defenses and the relation of an affirmative defense to a counter-
claim, it is stated at 2A, Moore's Federal Practice, 1f 8.27[3] 
on page 1855: 
"At common law matter in recoupment or set-off 
could be used defensively, but not for the 
purpose of obtaining an affirmative recovery. 
Recoupment arose from the same transation as 
the plaintiff's claim. Set-off, on the other 
hand, arose out of a transaction different from 
that sued on. Under Rule 13, recoupment affords 
the basis for a compulsory counterclaim; and 
set-off for a permissive counterclaim, and 
normally should be pleaded as such. Accordingly, 
Rule 8(c) does not specifically list them as 
affirmative defenses. At times, though, a 
defendant may desire to use recoupment or 
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set-off defensively, rather than as the basis 
of a counterclaim seeking affirmative relieff 
and he may properly do so. Aside from the 
denomination as 'counterclaim1 instead of 
defense,1 and a demand for judgment, there 
would be no substantial difference in statement." 
Further, on page 1851, it states: 
"It should be noted that the enumeration in Rule 
8(c) is not exclusive; 'Any other matter consti-
tuting an avoidance or affirmative defense' must 
be pleaded affirmatively also." 
A thorough reading of the case relied on by plaintiff 
in its brief, U.S. Plywood Corp. v. Hudson Lumber Co., 17 F.R.D. 
258 (1955), shows that that case is firmly in support of defendant's 
position. After explaining that the purpose of pleading is 
mere notice-giving and that formalism in pleading has been 
eliminated as to details of claims and defenses, the court 
stated that the allegations in pleadings should be construed 
in a manner favorable to the pleader; and if the language was 
at all ambiguous, it should be construed favorably to the 
pleader. In that case, the defendant sought to deduct damages 
occasioned by plaintiff's breach of contract from the amount 
owing to the plaintiff and pled this affirmatively. The court 
stated that the defense may be pleaded in diminution of the 
defendant's liability or in mitigation of the award due for 
the purchase price, and that the defense is not a counterclaim 
but a recoupment. The court then noted: 
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11
 There is a marked distinction between recoupment 
and a counterclaim. Recoupment does not seek an 
affirmative judgment. It is defensive." 17 F.R.D. 
262. 
In overruling the plaintiff's objection that the affirmative 
defense did not state any specific amount and that the pleading 
was, therefore, insufficient, the court stated that since no 
responsive pleading was required, then it did not prejudice 
the plaintiff, because he could find out by discovery the amount 
of the defendant's claim. 
In the present case, the defendant's affirmative defense 
does not seek judgment for any specific amount, because it is 
pled in mitigation of the plaintiff's claim and can only be 
allowed up to the amount of that claim. 
The defendant also asserted a counterclaim for its 
damages in a specific amount, asking for affirmative relief. 
The inability of the defendant to assert the counterclaim 
following the remand to the lower court in no way affects its 
right to assert its affirmative defense because it is a separate 
count or defense. Rule 8(e)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
states: 
"A party may set forth two or more statements of 
a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, 
either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements 
are made in the alternative and one of them if 
made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insuf-
ficiency of one or more of the alternative state-
ments." 
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In Basic Boats, Inc. v. United States, (E.D. Virginia, 
1970), 311 F.Supp. 596, 14 F.R.Serv.2d 180, where the defendant 
had asserted a counterclaim which was ruled to be barred by the 
statute of limitations, the court held: 
"Since the facts supporting the counterclaim 
undeniably arose out of the same cause of action 
which gives rise to plaintiff's suit, there is 
ample authority to the effect that the counter-
claim should be treated as an affirmative defense 
by way of recoupment, and this is true even though 
as an affirmative cause of action it may be barred 
by limitation." 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE DAMAGES 
CLAIMED BY THE DEFENDANT WERE REASONABLE 
In rendering its decision on plaintiff!s first appeal, 
in which plaintiff asserted as error the lower Court's allowance 
of defendant's deduction for its expenses and the lower Court's 
finding of the reasonableness of those expenses, this Court 
stated: 
"Other matters assigned as error have been 
considered and are deemed to be without merit." 
535 P.2d 1232. 
Little America had an emergency situation for transporting its 
employees to work each day in that it had no bus available 
to do so. The only bus line which could provide a bus 
immediately was the bus line chosen by the defendant (Tr. 113). 
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Mr. Knight, who testified that the expenses were reasonable 
(Tr. 115), was familiar with the expenses incurred in operation 
of Little America's own bus and had checked with a bus line in 
Salt Lake City to determine what another bus line would charge. 
(Tr. Ill) There was no evidence introduced by the plaintiff to 
show that these expenses were in fact unreasonable. 
The Court allowed expenses beginning on December 1, 
1972, to and including January 17, 19 73, which was the period 
of time following plaintiff's breach for failure to deliver at 
the end of November until the delivery. The amount of damages 
computed by the Court was based on the statements sent to Little 
America by Rock Springs-Jackson Bus Line (R. 85) as follows: 
Period Charge Amount 
Dec. 1 - Dec. 6 $25 per trip, 3 trips $ 450.00 
per day 
Dec. 7 - Jan. 2 $22.50 per trip, 3 trips 1,822.50 
per day 
Jan. 3 $22.50 per trip, 2 trips 45.00 
Jan. 8 $25 per trip, 2 trips 50.00 
Jan. 9-16 $22.50 per trip, 3 trips 600.00 
per day 
Jan. 17 $25 per trip, 1 trip 25.00 
TOTAL $2,992.50 
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POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM FOR EXPENSES FOR THE REPAIR OF ITS LOANER BUS 
Plaintiff claims that an expense in the amount of 
$845 should be paid to it for the repair of its loaner busf 
which claim is set forth in the plaintiff's Reply to defendant's 
Counterclaim (R. 76). There was never any definite evidence 
presented by the plaintiff for its claim upon which the Court 
could grant relief. Mr, Urie, plaintiff's General Manager, stated 
in response to the question, "Do you remember the approximate 
odd dollars or is it —", answered: 
"Between $800 and $900. It was approximately 
$845 or 50 dollars -- between eight and nine 
hundred." (Tr. 80) 
It was improper for the plaintiff to state a new cause 
of action for additional damages in its Reply to defendant's 
Counterclaim. In Straw v. Temple, 48 Utah 258, 159 P. 44 (1916), 
the court stated that the plaintiff cannot enlarge its complaint 
by allegations in its reply; in other words, in no event can a 
cause of action be either stated or enlarged in the reply to a 
counterclaim. 
An allegation in a reply is to take issue with an answer 
or counterclaim and cannot initiate, in whole or in part, a 
cause of action. See Utah Lead Co. v. Piute County, 92 Utah 
1, 65 P.2d 1190 (1937). 
The loaner bus was given to the defendant for its use 
free of charge and without any contractual obligation for the 
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care or maintenance of the bus (Tr. 60, Tr. 122). Because 
the plaintiff had failed to deliver a bus within the period 
of approximately ninety days, which the plaintiff had originally 
indicated would be the delivery time, the plaintiff recognized 
that it was its obligation to bear the expense of supplying a 
substitute bus for the defendant and bearing all costs incident 
thereto. There is no evidence to indicate the cause of the 
damage to the motor of the bus, nor any evidence to indicate 
that the defendant was in any way at fault. 
Furthermore, the lower Court's denial of plaintiff's 
claim for $845 was alleged as error by the plaintiff in its 
first appeal to this Court. In rendering its decision on that 
appeal, this Court stated: 
"Other matters assigned as error have been 
considered and are deemed to be without merit." 
535 P.2d 1232. 
This claim has been previously considered by this Court and 
rejected; the evidence supporting it is inadequate; it was 
improperly asserted in plaintiff's Reply to defendant's Counter-
claim; and should, therefore, once again be denied. 
POINT VI 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM FOR INTEREST AND ATTORNEYS1 FEES 
The plaintiff bases its claim for attorneys ' fees and 
interest on an invoice (Ex. 3-P, R. 99), which was signed by 
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Dave Timlin, an .employee of Little America, who was required 
to sign the invoice before he drove the bus away to indicate 
that he had received it. 
There is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Timlin had 
any actual or implied authority to enter into a contractual 
obligation requiring Little America to pay interest and 
attorneys1 fees. Mr. Timlin is a bus driver and it was stated 
that he was an employee whose scope of employment did not 
exceed picking up the bus for Little America (Tr. 78). 
These facts fall squarely within the holding of Spanish 
Fork Packing Co. v. House of Fine Meats, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 312, 
508 P.2d 1186 (1973), in which an employee received deliveries 
of meat products for the defendant and signed an invoice 
acknowledging receipt of the meat, and where the court held 
that there was no binding contract for interest and attorneys1 
fees because in the application of basic contract principles, 
the creation of a contract requires a meeting of the minds of 
the parties and the burden of so proving is upon the party who 
claims there was a contract. The court cited an earlier case, 
B & R Supply Co. v. J.M. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 
(1972), which states: 
" . . . It is first to be observed that the conditions 
of the invoice are aptly described by the defendants 
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as 'small inconspicuous print*' Defendant's 
affidavit avers that they " . . . at no time what-
soever authorized any of the persons who signed 
certain invoices . . . to contract on his behalf 
• . . other than on open accounts. ' There is no 
affirmative showing to the contrary, nor that any 
contractual terms or conditions on the invoices 
were called to their attention, nor that they were 
aware of them, nor that they did anything other 
than to initial the invoices acknowledging receipt 
of the merchandise. Under those circumstances 
we can see no basis for a conclusion that the 
defendant entered into a contract to pay attorneys ' 
fees." 503 P.2d 1217. 
The court went on to observe that in delivering the product the 
plaintiff was doing what it was required to do already under 
the original contract, and then stated: 
"If upon receipt of the merchandise, the invoice 
or delivery slip, the purchaser signed, purported 
to impose further conditions or covenants, a serious 
question would arise as to whether there was any 
consideration for such further obligation." 508 P. 2d 1187 
The facts of the present case fall squarely within 
the holding of the two Utah cases cited above, and the 
plaintiff's claim for interest and attorneys1 fees based on 
an alleged contract should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon remand after reversal by this Court, the lower 
Court properly considered plaintiff's Complaint and defendant's 
affirmative defense. The evidence showed that plaintiff promised 
delivery of the bus by the end of November, 1972, and the Court 
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properly deducted defendant's damages occasioned by the 
plaintiff's breach of the contract for failure to deliver 
the bus as of that date. The evidence supports the lower 
Court's conclusion that the damages claimed by the defendant 
were reasonable and that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
expenses for repair of its loaner bus or attorneys' fees and 
interest. This Court should affirm. 
DATED this 1st day of May, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
By 
JAMES M. RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
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